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Abstract
Public announcement logic (PAL) is a simple dynamic epistemic logic
extending reasoning about knowledge of agents with a modal operator
for simultaneous and transparent knowledge updates. This logic is no
more expressive than epistemic logic (EL) without updates, but exhibits
compact representation of a number of complex epistemic situations. A
labeled tableau proof system to reason with these updates directly is pre-
sented here. This system can analyse and present well-known epistemic
puzzles like ‘muddy children’ and ‘three wise men’. Using the KE tableau
system as a basis, the modal and propositional characteristics of epistemic
updates can be separated.
Key words: Public announcement logic; epistemic logic; KE; semantic
tableaux.
1 Introduction
This paper provides a tableau proof method for PAL that is both practical and
intuitive for human provers. Little new notation is introduced and we stay close
to existing systems. Because PAL can (only) succinctly represent what would
otherwise be incomprehensible in EL [9], one of the objectives of PAL must
be the presentation and explanation of (formal) reasoning. Tableaux, as they
are—in contrast to axiomatic proof—easy to construct and easy to read, also
have their purpose in the explanation of their underlying logic and reasoning.
These goals meet in the PALKE tableau system.
System PALKE extends the well-known labeled tableau scheme for modal
logics from [6] in such a way that the general form of the original rules dealing
with modals can be left unaltered. Using the KE tableau system from [3] allows
for this elegant formulation and does not lead to a more complex system in
comparison with the non-KE system. In representative cases, e.g. in solving
the three wise men puzzle, PALKE gives short and informative proofs.
∗This work is based on [4] as completed under the supervision of B.P. Kooi and L.C. Ver-
brugge at the University of Groningen, The Netherlands. An inferior (but better looking) ver-
sion of this paper will appear/has appeared in the (pre-)proceedings of the Formal Approaches
to Multi-Agent Systems workshop (FAMAS’007, MALLOW’007), 6 and 7 September 2007,
Durham, UK.
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This paper is structured as follows. After a brief formal introduction of PAL,
its syntax, semantics and axiomatisation in sections 2 and 3, we meet tableau
proof system PALKE in section 4. Soundness and completeness of PALKE is
shown in unsurprising ways in section 5. Example tableaux are given throughout
section 4 and 5, section 6 is dedicated to the example of a formalisation of the
three wise men puzzle in PAL and its tableau proof. The relation of PALKE to
the ‘Lima’ tableau proof method for PAL from [2] is discussed in section 7.
2 Syntax and Semantics
Modal logic with possible world semantics as epistemic logic was introduced
in [8]. The extension of epistemic logic with public announcements or updates
originates from [11]. Notations and conventions from [14] are used here.
Definition 2.1 The language Lpal(PA) of public announcement logic is induc-
tively defined as
φ ::= p ¬φ (φ1 ∧ φ2) aφ [φ1]φ2
where a ∈ A, a finite set of agents and p ∈ P , a countably infinite set of
atoms. The language of epistemic logic Lel is the language without [φ1]φ2 and
the language of propositional logic Lpl without aφ as well. We will use the
usual abbreviations >, ⊥, (φ1 → φ2), (φ1 ∨ φ2), (φ1 ↔ φ2), ♦aφ and 〈φ1〉φ2.
Read aφ as ‘agent a knows that φ’ and ♦aφ as ‘agent a holds φ posssible.
An update formula [φ]ψ reads as ‘after the public announcement of φ, ψ is true
and its dual 〈φ〉ψ as ‘announcement φ can be made (that is, φ is true) and after
it, ψ is true’.
Definition 2.2 An epistemic model M = 〈W,R, V 〉 consists of a finite non-
empty set of possible worlds W , an accessibility relation R : A→ 2W×W and a
valuation V : W × P → {1, 0}. We write w ∼a w′ or wRaw′ if (w,w′) ∈ R(a)
for ‘w′ is accessible from w for agent a’ and (M, w) for an epistemic state or
pointed model with w ∈W .
Each R(a) is an equivalence relation here, as is usual for epistemic logic,
which we take to be the multi-modal logic S5n. So, agents only know true facts
and are capable of both positive and negative introspection.
Definition 2.3 Let (M, w) be an epistemic model with M = 〈W,R, V 〉 and
w, v ∈W , p ∈ P , i ∈ A and φ, ψ, χ in Lpal(PA).
M, w |= p :⇔ Vw(p) = 1
M, w |= ¬φ :⇔ M, w 6|= φ
M, w |= φ ∧ ψ :⇔ M, w |= φ and M, w |= ψ
M, w |= iφ :⇔ for all v ∈W : w ∼i v implies M, v |= φ
M, w |= [φ]ψ :⇔ M, w |= φ implies M|φ, w |= ψ
Model M|φ := 〈W ′, R′, V ′〉 is defined as
W ′ := {w′ ∈W | M, w′ |= φ}
R′(i) := R(i) ∩ (W ′ ×W ′)
V ′w(p) := Vw(p) W ′
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all propositional tautologies
` a(φ→ ψ)→ (aφ→ aψ) distribution
` aφ→ φ truth
` aφ→ aaφ positive introspection
` ♦aφ→ a♦aφ negative introspection
` [φ]p↔ (φ→ p) atoms
` [φ]¬ψ ↔ (φ→ ¬[φ]ψ) partial function
` [φ](ψ ∧ χ)↔ ([φ]ψ ∧ [φ]χ) distribution
` [φ]iψ ↔ (φ→ i[φ]ψ) knowledge update
` [φ][ψ]χ↔ [φ ∧ [φ]ψ]χ combined updates
from ` φ and ` φ→ ψ infer ` ψ modus ponens
from ` φ and ` iφ necessity for i
from ` φ and ` [ψ]φ necessity for [ψ]
Table 1: Proof system PALPA with φ, ψ, χ formulas in LPAL(PA), a some agent
in A and p some propositional atom in P .
We can readM|φ as a submodel ofM, containing exactly the possible worlds
ofM where φ was true. So, semantically, public announcement logic is a world
elimination game, illustrated in [14, 11, 12, 13].
3 Axiomatisation
The axiomatisation for PAL in table 1 from [14] is only briefly discussed here and
included for use in the next section. Because PAL is no more expressive than
EL its Hilbert-style proof system sports so-called reduction axioms. Systematic
application of the reduction axioms translates any formula in PAL into a formula
in EL without updates, preserving truth value. As is shown in [9], the length of
these translations might be exponential in the length of the original formula in
PAL.
4 Tableau Method
A tableau for a formula φ is a tree with root the labeled formula 1 ¬φ and
is constructed by the application of tableau rules. A label is a sequence of
integers with agent subscripts but starting with ‘1’, for instance label 1.1a.2e,
possibly preceded by a sequence of formulas in brackets: (♦ap)(e(q ∨ p))1.1i.
Labels represent paths through (updated) epistemic models, e.g. (p)(q)1.1a p is
a picture of M|q|p, w′ |= p with w ∼a w′ ∈ R′.
A closed tableau with root 1 ¬φ is a proof for φ. A tableau is closed if all its
branches are closed. Closed branches have two nodes of the form σ φ and σ ¬φ
and are leafed ‘=’. A tableau branch that cannot be closed by the application
of tableau rules is a counter example of φ and is leafed ‘↑’. If a branch B of a
tableau is a counter example for φ then a countermodel M can be constructed
from the formulas on B with M, w |= ¬φ.
The tableau rules in table 2 form the proof system PALKE. Omitting the
rules concerning updates results in the system KEEL. Leaving out the rules for
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σ φ ∧ ψ
σ φ
σ ψ
σ ¬(φ ∧ ψ)
σ φ
σ ¬ψ
σ ¬(φ ∧ ψ)
σ ψ
σ ¬φ σ φ σ ¬φ
α β1 β2 PB
σ aφ
σ.ha φ
σ ¬aφ
σ.na ¬φ
σ.ma aφ
σ.ha φ
σ.ma ¬aφ
σ.na ¬φ
σ aφ
σ φ
σ.ma aφ
σ φ
Ka Ma Ka= M
a
= T
a Ba
σ [χ]ψ
(χ)σ ψ
σ ¬[φ]ψ
(φ)σ ¬ψ
(φ)σ p
σ p
(φ)σ ¬p
σ ¬p
(φ)σ
σ φ
σ φ
(φ)σ
updates persistence correspondence
Table 2: The PALKE tableau system. Underlined labels must already exist on
the branch (label selection) and over-lined labels must be new (label introduc-
tion). In rule Ma, σ must be a non-a-label.
agent knowledge as well, we have unsigned KE for propositional logic.
Unlike the usual Smullyan tableaux TAB, system KE has a principle of
bivalence (PB) as the only forking rule and non-forking β rules. The PB can
be seen as the tableau counterpart of the sequent cut rule. Rule PB allows the
introduction of arbitrary formulas on tableau branches and therefore KE is not
analytic. Limiting the use of PB to (labeled, negated) subformulas of formulas
already on the branch gives access to a whole class of analytic applications
of (PAL)KE. A possible analytic application of KE in the propositional case
(and for EL too) could be the limitation of PB to introducing σ φ | σ ¬φ and
σ ψ | σ ¬ψ on a branch B with formula σ ¬(φ ∧ ψ) already on B and σ φ, σ ψ
not. Note that KE does not need a double negation rule (σ ¬¬φ/σ φ), but it
would be acceptable to use it as an abbreviation.
System KEEL for epistemic logic is a variation on the more straightforward
proof system KMT44r from [5]. System KMT44r applies rules Ka, Ma and
T a from table 2 and rules 4a and 4ra as shown in table 3 on page 4. System
KEEL is more well-behaved than KMT44r and forms a finite, loop-checking
free decision procedure for proving formulas in epistemic logic almost in itself.
In using KEEL, for any given formula σ ¬aφ we have, as usual, only one choice:
if σ is an a-label we use rule Ma=, rule M
a otherwise. Analysing formulas σ aφ
we can select a label σ′.ha or σ′, where σ = σ′.ma or σ = σ′. When we consider
σ′ = σ as selection of an ‘empty’ prefix, label σ.εa, implementation of KEEL
with free variables in labels can prevent duplication of formulas and moves
all choice points to the moment of branch closure, see [4]. Implementation of a
KMT44r style system is more difficult because endless repetition of rules 4a and
4ra must be prevented. It must be admitted however, that this implementational
trickery seems to works less well when updates come into play.
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1 〈p ∧ ¬ap〉(p ∧ ¬ap) 1.
(p ∧ ¬ap)1 p ∧ ¬ap (upd. 1) 2.
(p ∧ ¬ap)1 p (α 2) 3.
(p ∧ ¬ap)1 ¬ap (α 2) 4.
(p ∧ ¬ap)1.1a ¬p (Ma 4) 5.
1.1a ¬p (pers. 5) 6.
1.1a p ∧ ¬ap (corr. 5) 7.
1.1a p (α 7) 8.
= (8× 6)
Figure 1: A tableau proof for an unsuccessful update where a formula is in fact
rendered false by it’s own announcement. For reference, formulas are numbered
and applied rules are given on the right. Note that abbreviation σ 〈φ〉ψ is here
directly analyzed to (φ)σ ψ.
The tableau rules for epistemic logic do not interact with PB and we could
use the Smullyan system TAB to give a sound and complete tableau proof system
for epistemic logic. Unlike KEEL, PALKE explicitly needs PB for completeness;
observe the following cases. Analysis of formulas σ [φ]ψ when (φ)σ is not a label
on the branch and σ φ is not a formula on the branch, requires a fork σ φ | σ ¬φ.
Bringing a label σ.na in reach for selection by a formula (φ)σ aφ might require
a fork with σ.ni φ | σ.ni ¬φ to see whether σ.ni belongs inM′|φ. For example, if
we want to expand a branch B by selection of a label 1.1i from (φ)(ψ)(χ)1 iξ
and even (χ)1.1i is not on B we could apply PB three times, creating four
branches, eventually only expanding one of them with (φ)(ψ)(χ)1.1i ξ. To
begin with a fork 1.1i ¬[χ][ψ][φ]⊥ | 1.1i [χ][ψ][φ]⊥ would of course also be
acceptable. Note that we have to restrict PB to existing labels or we could
introduce (⊥)1 φ | (⊥)1 ¬φ, closing both branches by correspondence.
5 Soundness and Completeness
Soundness and completeness of KEEL is easily shown by comparison with the
S5n tableau system KMT44r. Rules Ma= and K
a
= are multi-modal variants of
the simple mono-modal S5 rules from [5, page 113], [6] and are sound directly
by semantics: the S5 accessability relation for single agents holds between any
two connected worlds. Rule Ba is S5-sound by symmetry, we could also see it
as the application of rules 4ra + T a. For completeness we show that rules 4a
and 4ra from table 3 have in fact become redundant.
Proposition 5.1 Proofs in KEEL simulate proofs in KMT44r.
Proof If we can close a branch B by the application of rule 4a on σ aφ,
meaning we have a formula σ.ha¬aφ already on B, we can also close B by
application of Ma= on σ.ha¬aφ and Ka on σ aφ. The same goes for the other
variations of aφ and ♦aφ formulas and for closure by application of rule 4ra,
by way of rules Ma and Ba.
Non-closing applications of rules 4a and 4ra, meaning combinations of ap-
plications of rules 4a+Ka, 4ra+T a etc. (the second rule must always be a rule
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4a
σ aφ
σ.ha aφ
4ra
σ.na aφ
σ aφ
Table 3: Tableau rules 4a and 4ra of system KMT44r
on formulas of the form σ′ aφ, the result of both 4a and 4ra), is equivalent to
application of a rule in KEEL in the following cases:
– 4a + Ka= = K
a
– 4a + T a = Ka
– 4a + Ba = T a
– 4a + 4ra = 4ar + 4
a = do nothing
– 4ra+ Ka = Ka
– 4ra+ Ka= = K
a
– 4ra+ T a = Ba .
Applications 4a + Ka, 4a + 4a, 4ra + 4ra and 4ra + Ba deal with labels of
the form σ.ma.na which are not required in proofs: KEEL explicitly disallows
labels of this form. Any branch closure with two labels 1 . . . .ma.na . . . could
be closed on these labels with ma stripped from the label by either rule Ma=,
introducing na in place of ma or Ka=, selecting na in place of ma.
Soundness of PALKE is by the usual arguments, from [6]. A set S of labeled
formulas is PAL satisfiable in an epistemic model M = 〈W,R, V 〉 if there is a
mapping N (σ) = (M′, w) from every σ φ ∈ S so that w ∈ W and M′ is M
or the submodel corresponding to σ, e.g. N ((ap)(p→ q)1) = (M|p→q|ap, w)
and N (σ) |= φ. A tableau branch is satisfiable if its set of formulas is satisfiable
and a tableau is satisfiable if at least one of its branches is.
Proposition 5.2 A satisfiable tableau cannot be closed by application of the
PALKE tableau rules.
Proof We only show this for the rules not in KEEL. We take tableau branch
B satisfying model M = 〈W,R, V 〉.
• Update1: σ [φ]ψ and label (φ)σ are on B and we add {(φ)σ ψ} to B. We
now haveN ((φ)σ) |= ψ which follows fromN (σ) |= [φ]ψ,N (σ) = (M′, w),
N ((φ)σ) = (M′|φ, w), and so (M′, w) |= φ.
• Update2: σ ¬[φ]ψ is on B and we add (φ)σ ¬ψ. Now we must have
N ((φ)σ) |= ¬ψ which follows from N (σ) |= ¬[φ]ψ and N (σ) = (M′, w)
and N ((φ)σ) = (M′|φ, w).
• Persistence1: (φ)σ p is on B. TakeN (σ) = (M′, w) withM′ = 〈W ′, R′, V ′〉
and N ((φ)σ) = (M′|φ, w) with M′|φ = 〈W ′′, R′′, V ′′〉. We have by defi-
nition V ′′w (p) := V
′
w(p) (obviously W
′′ ⊆W ′).
• Persistence2: (φ)σ ¬p is on B. As persistence1.
• Correspondence1: (φ)σ is a label on B and we add σ φ. N (σ) maps
to some (M′, w), w ∈ W ′ and now N ((φ)σ) maps to (M′|φ, w), exactly
following semantics: W ′′ := {w ∈W ′|M′, w |= φ}.
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1 ¬((φ→ i[φ]ψ)→ [φ]iψ) 1.
1 (φ→ i[φ]ψ) (α1) 2.
1 ¬[φ]iψ (α2) 3.
(φ)1 ¬iψ (upd.) 4.
(φ)1.1i ¬ψ (M i) 5.
1 φ (corr.) 6.
1.1i φ (corr.) 7.
1 i[φ]ψ (β) 8.
1.1i [φ]ψ (Ki) 9.
(φ)1.1i ψ (upd.) 10.
=
Figure 2: A tableau for a ‘knowledge update’. This is one half of the knowledge
update axiom of table 1. With some effort we can prove all PAL reduction
axioms in PALKE.
• Correspondence2: σ φ is on B and we add label (φ)σ. As correspondence1.
Proposition 5.3 (Soundness) If there is a PALKE tableau proof for φ then
for any pointed model we have (M, w) |= φ.
Proof By the application of tableau rules we can close 1 ¬φ. If there is a
model (M, w) |= ¬φ then N (1) |= ¬φ must be satisfiable and closable at the
same time, which is impossible as then we must have (M′, w′) |= φ ∧ ¬φ.
For completeness it suffices to prove that the PAL reduction axioms from
table 1 can be proven in tableaux. For the most part this can be done directly,
only the combined updates axiom requires some more work. We have already
seen a proof for (half of) the knowledge update axiom in figure 2, the other
axiom tableaux are similar and not given here.
Proposition 5.4 PALKE is complete for the PAL reduction axioms
Proof Only the axiom ` [φ][ψ]χ↔ [φ∧ [φ]ψ]χ does not appear to have a direct
proof. Figure 3 shows an attempted proof for half of the combined updates
axiom. We prove closure on σ1 χ and σ2 ¬χ where σ1 stands for (φ ∧ [φ]ψ)σ
and σ2 for (ψ)(φ)σ.
• base case: χ is p or χ is ¬p, closure on persistence.
• χ is of the form χ′1 ∧χ′2. We fork on σ2 χ′2 | σ2 ¬χ′2 and will have to close
the two branches on σ1 χ′1, σ2 ¬χ′1 and σ1 χ′2, σ2 ¬χ′2. The same for the
other propositional connectives.
• χ is of the form aχ′. We analyse to σ2.1a ¬χ′ (label introduction) and we
fork with σ.1i φ∧ [φ]ψ | σ.1i ¬(φ∧ [φ]ψ) and we are in the same situation
as the tableau in figure 3, formulas 8 and 9, but now in label σ.1i with χ′
instead of σ with χ and the analysis goes the same. The same for ♦aχ′
etc.
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1 ¬([φ ∧ [φ]ψ]χ→ [φ][ψ]χ) 1.
1 [φ ∧ [φ]ψ]χ 2.
1 ¬[φ][ψ]χ 3.
(φ)1 ¬[ψ]χ 4.
(ψ)(φ)1 ¬χ 5.
(φ)1 ψ 6.
1 φ 7.
1 φ ∧ [φ]ψ 8.
(φ ∧ [φ]ψ)1 10.
(φ ∧ [φ]ψ)1 χ 11.
...
1 ¬(φ ∧ [φ]ψ) 9.
1 ¬[φ]ψ 12.
(φ)1 ¬ψ 13.
=
Figure 3: A tableau for combined updates. For any explicitly formulated χ we
can close the tableau.
• χ is of the form [χ′1]χ′2. We get (χ′1)σ2 ¬χ′2 and fork with σ1 χ′1 | σ1 ¬χ′1.
The left branch is to be closed on (χ′1)σ2 ¬χ′2 and (χ′1)σ1 χ′2 and the right
branch on σ2 χ′1 and σ1 ¬χ′1. The same for 〈χ′1〉χ′2 etc.
In the last three cases we have produced branches with formulas σ′1 χ
′ and σ′2 ¬χ′
with χ′ a subformula of χ. By induction on the structure of χ, all instances of
χ′ reduce to the base case and the entire tableau closes.
Proposition 5.5 PALKE is complete for update reduction φ ↔ φt for every
PAL formula φ and its translation to EL φt.
Proof (Sketch) From completeness of the reduction axioms [14] we know there
is a finite sequence of formulas φt0 ↔ φt1 , ..., φtn−1 ↔ φtn with φ = φt0 , φtn = φt
and φtk+1 a formula where exactly one instance of an update is reduced from φtk .
From completeness for EL and the reduction axioms of PALKE it follows we can
prove each φtk−1 ↔ φtk so we can can also prove φt0 ↔ φt1 ∧ ... ∧ φtn−1 ↔ φtn
and by propositional logic it follows that φ↔ φt.
Proposition 5.6 (Completeness) If |=PAL φ then there is a PALKE tableau
proof for φ.
Proof We can prove φ↔ φt in a tableau. By completeness for EL, we can also
prove φt in a tableau. If we cannot prove φ in a tableau we also cannot prove
¬(φ↔ φt)∨¬φt∨φ, because all three formulas are unprovable. However, we can
prove ¬(φ ↔ φt) ∨ ¬φt ∨ φ by propositional logic, rendering the unprovability
of φ inconsistent.
6 An Example
As an example of a more elaborate proof in PALKE we formalise the following
variation of the well-known three wise men puzzle from [10]:
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A certain king wishes to test his three wise men. He arranges
them in a circle so that they can see and hear each other and tells
them that he will put a white or black spot on each of their foreheads
but that at least one spot will be white. In fact all three spots are
white. He then asks them, “Do you know the color of your spot?”
The first answers “I don’t know the color of my spot”. The second
answers “I don’t know either”. The third then answers “Now I
know!”.
Variations of this puzzle and some very similar accounts of the muddy children
puzzle are formalized in, just to name a few, [10, 7, 12, 5]. The puzzle is also
an example in the Logics Workbench manuals1. The formulation given here is
closest to an alternative formalisation for the LWB by Van Ditmarsch2.
To solve the three wise men puzzle we don’t have to find a single correct
answer (“all spots are white”), but an explanation showing there is some actual
sound reasoning going on. PAL and PALKE are well suited for this task and
capture the puzzle’s full dynamics. We give an informative, direct and short
proof showing that the puzzle indeed captures an eternal truth.
The three wise men puzzle is formulated in PAL as follows. Let agents 1, 2,
3 be our three wise men and a, b, c the facts that respectively 1, 2, 3 have a
white spot. The men observing each other (but not themselves) is represented
by (¬a → (2¬a ∧ 3¬a)) ∧ (¬b → (1¬b ∧ 3¬b)) ∧ (¬c → (1¬c ∧ 2¬c)).
When 1 has a black spot (that is, not a white spot) 2 and 3 know this etc. The
fact that at least one of the spots is white is represented by (a ∨ b ∨ c). The
utterances of 1 not knowing, 2 not knowing and 3 knowing are then ♦1a, ♦2b
and 3c. The tableau in figure 4 proves that, after the announcement of the
fact that at least one spot is white and the men observing each other and the
announcements that 1 does not know and 2 does not know, 3 does know his
spot is white. So, the given formulation is true in any epistemic model.
From the proof in figure 4, we can observe some well-known facts about the
three wise men puzzle. First, the three wise men puzzle is a K theorem as only
modal rules Ka and Ma are used in the proof. Second, the observation of the
spot of 1 (¬a → (2¬a ∧ 3¬a)) plays no part in the proof. This is the case
where 1 would hide his spot. Then, from the announcements of 1 and 2 and
the observation of the spots of 2 and 3 alone, 3 would still know he has a white
spot. When 1 says “I don’t know”, 2 and 3 must conclude that 1 sees either one
or two white spots. When 2 now says “I don’t know”, 3 must conclude that 2
sees a white spot as well or 2 would have know to have a white spot and 3 still
concludes to have a white spot. So now, for agents with S5 knowledge we could
also prove [(¬a ∨ ¬b ∨ ¬c) ∧ (b→ 13b) ∧ (c→ 12c)][♦1a][♦2b]3¬c (here
a, b, c would represent black spots).
7 Related Work, the Lima System
A different and independently conceived tableau method for (an extension of)
public announcement logic is presented in [1]. Apart from notational differences,
1The LWB is a popular theorem prover developed at the University of Bern, Switserland;
http://www.lwb.unibe.ch.
2http://tcw2.ppsw.rug.nl/mas/LOK/lwb
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WM ≡ (a ∨ b ∨ c) ∧ (¬a→ (2¬a ∧3¬a)) ∧ (¬b→ (1¬b ∧3¬b)) ∧ (¬c→
(1¬c ∧2¬c))
1 ¬[WM][♦1¬a][♦2¬b]3c 1.
(WM)1 ¬[♦1¬a][♦2¬b]3c (upd. 1) 2.
(♦1¬a)(WM)1 ¬[♦2¬b]3c (upd. 2) 3.
(♦2¬b)(♦1¬a)(WM)1 ¬3c (upd. 3) 4.
(♦2¬b)(♦1¬a)(WM)1.13 ¬c (M1 4) 5.
(♦1¬a)(WM)1.13 ♦2¬b (corr. 5) 6.
(♦1¬a)(WM)1.13.12 ¬b (M2 6) 7.
(WM)1.13.12 ♦1¬a (corr. 7) 8.
(WM)1.13.12.11 ¬a (M1 8) 9.
1.13 WM (corr. abbr. 6) 10.
1.13 ¬c (pers. abbr. 5) 11.
1.13 2¬c (β abbr. 10, 11) 12.
1.13.12 ¬c (K2 12) 13.
1.13.12 WM (corr. 8) 14.
1.13.12 ¬b (pers. abbr. 7) 15.
1.13.12 1¬c (β abbr. 13, 14) 16.
1.13.12 1¬b (β abbr. 15, 14) 17.
1.13.12.11 ¬c (K1 16) 18.
1.13.12.11 ¬b (K1 17) 19.
1.13.12.11 ¬a (pers. 9) 20.
1.13.12.11 WM (corr. 9) 21.
1.13.12.11 (a ∨ b ∨ c) (α 21) 22.
= (abbr. [18, 19, 20]× 22)
Figure 4: A tableau for the three wise men puzzle. Some intermittent steps are
omitted, marked by the most relevant rule used and abbr.
this system, here referred to as the ‘Lima’ system (as I believe the PALKE is re-
ferred to as the ‘Boer’ system) does not use a bivalence rule and the propositional
and modal aspects of updates are not separated as was done here. To compare
these systems a rendering of the Lima system in PALKE notation is given in ta-
ble 4. These rules, as is necessary for a cut-free proof system, exactly represent
the worst case scenario of the application of the bivalence rule of (PAL)KE. Lima
tableaus close only on propositional atoms: (φn) . . . (φ1)σ p× (ψn) . . . (ψ1)σ ¬p,
so Lima is again not substitution-closed, that is, not all rules apply to all for-
mulas alike [13].
Clearly, PALKE can linearly simulate the Lima system. For instance, the
Lima rules for (ψn) . . . (ψ1)1.σ aφ give n+1 branches with 1 . . . n+1 conclusions
corresponding with n times PB and 0 . . . n times correspondence on each branch
and a PALKE σ aφ rule once on the rightmost branch. Formulas already on
the branch should be omitted as is intended in the Lima system.
From the fact that PALKE can linearly simulate the Lima system and the
Lima system cannot simulate PALKE at all (directly from PB), it follows that
the complexity of PALKE is at most equal to that of the Lima system. The
Lima system can be seen as an analytic application of the PALKE system and
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(ψn) . . . (ψ1)1.σ aφ
1.σ′ ¬ψ1 1.σ′ ψ1 . . . 1.σ′ ψ1 1.σ′ ψ1
(ψ1)1.σ′ ¬ψ2 . . . (ψ1)1.σ′ ψ2 (ψ1)1.σ′ ψ2
. . .
...
...
(ψn−1) . . . 1.σ′ ¬ψn (ψn−1) . . . 1.σ′ ψn
(ψn)(ψn−1) . . . 1.σ′ φ′
σ aφ
σ φ
...
(ψn) . . . (ψ1)1.σ ¬aφ
1.σ.na ψ1
...
(ψn−1) . . . (ψ1)1.σ.na ψn
(ψn)(ψn−1) . . . (ψ1)1.σ.na ¬φ
σ ¬[χ]φ
σ χ
(χ)σ ¬φ
...
σ [χ]φ
σ ¬χ σ χ
(χ)σ φ
...
Table 4: The Lima system as rendered in PALKE notation. Formula . . . σ′ φ′
is selected according to rules Ka,4a or 4ra as before and 1.σ.na is a new label.
The TAB rules for propositional connectives are omitted.
it may be the “right” analytic application. However, there might be analytic
applications of PALKE that are better at least for many cases.
In [2], proof procedures are given for the Lima system that stay within the
PSPACE bound for multi- K, KT and S4 modals + PAL. It seems likely that
there also exist such procedures for full S5n-PAL but none have been found
that stay within polynomial space. These results equally apply to the PALKE
system.
8 Conclusion
The simple proof system PALKE for public announcement logic was introduced.
This system is capable of analysing formalisations in PAL in an appealing way.
Using KE as the underlying propositional formalism retains the pleasant fea-
tures of labeled tableaux for modal logic. The KEEL tableau rules also improve
on labeled tableaux for epistemic logic. The PALKE system’s analytical appli-
cations allow for further and more general research in decision procedures for
dynamic epistemic logics.
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